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This paper studies the impact of strategic customer behavior on supply chain performance. We start with
a newsvendor seller facing forward-looking customers. The seller initially charges a regular price but may
salvage the leftover inventory at a lower salvage price after random demand is realized. Customers anticipate
future sales and choose purchase timing to maximize their expected surplus. We characterize the rational
expectations (RE) equilibrium, where we find that the seller’s stocking level is lower than that in the classic
model without strategic customers. We show that the seller’s profit can be improved by promising that: either
quantities available will be limited (quantity commitment) or prices will be kept high (price commitment).
In most cases, both forms of commitment are not credible in a centralized supply chain with a single seller.
However, decentralized supply chains can use contractual arrangements as indirect commitment devices to
attain the desired outcomes with commitment. While decentralization has generally been associated with
coordination problems, we present the contrasting view that disparate interests within a supply chain can
actually improve overall supply chain performance. In particular, with strategic customer behavior, we find
that: (i) a decentralized supply chain with a wholesale price contract may perform strictly better than
a centralized supply chain; (ii) contracts widely studied in the supply chain coordination literature (e.g.,
markdown money, sales rebates, and buyback contracts) can serve as a commitment device as well as an
incentive-coordinating device; and (iii) some of the above contracts cannot allocate profits arbitrarily between
supply chain members due to strategic customer behavior.
1. Introduction
Consumers today have largely been trained to wait for sales. This is a general consensus, widely
accepted by practitioners and academics alike. Year after year, market research organizations con-
duct surveys with holiday season shoppers and find that more than half of them plan to wait for
the year-end sales. Together with competitive pressures, this has forced retailers to offer steeper
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discounts, earlier and earlier into the retail season (Byrnes and Zellner, 2004). The inevitable con-
sequence is a vicious cycle: consumers expect increasingly generous discounts, and retailers fulfill
these expectations by cutting deeper and deeper into their margins. Decreased profit margins chal-
lenge the ability of these businesses to provide an adequate level of retail service, and this leads to
decreased customer satisfaction.
The retail industry has long recognized the critical impact of bargain-hunting behavior on the
bottom-line, and the advent of markdown optimization offers an opportunity to tackle this issue
directly (Sliwa, 2003). Markdown optimization balances supply and demand and increases the sell-
through rate by setting prices in response to available inventory. As a result, consumers may no
longer benefit from blindly waiting for sales, because it is now more likely that their desired product
will be sold out if they wait for too long. This approach has led to substantial profit increases at
several major retailers such as Bloomingdale’s and Gap (Kadet, 2004). These recent trends suggest
that strategic consumer behavior is not only attracting attention in the retail industry, but active
measures are also being adopted to lessen its negative impact.
Although the importance of strategic consumer behavior is widely acknowledged, there has been
little research studying its implications on supply chain management. In view of this gap in the
literature, this paper has three main objectives. First, we would like to develop a modeling frame-
work to study strategic consumer behavior in supply chains. We begin with the classic newsvendor
setting, which is a fundamental building block in the literature, and proceed to incorporate strate-
gic demand into the model. Second, we would like to use this model to investigate the impact
of strategic consumer behavior on supply chain performance. Although it is intuitively clear that
the effect on firm profits is negative, the economic mechanisms underlying these effects need to be
understood better. The third objective is prescriptive: when consumers are strategic, how can we
better manage the supply chain? In a centralized setting, how should firms determine pricing and
inventory decisions? In decentralized systems, how should the incentives of various parties (e.g.,
manufacturers, retailers, and consumers) be coordinated?
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Our model builds upon the classic newsvendor model. In the usual setup, the newsvendor faces
a random aggregate demand X, chooses the stocking quantity Q, and the exogenous parameters
are p (regular price), c (cost), and s (salvage price). To incorporate strategic behavior among the
consumers (in the demand pool X), we allow the consumers to either buy at the regular price p or
wait for the salvage price s. If there is inventory remaining at the salvage price, the consumers who
wait may get a good deal; otherwise, they end up without the product. The newsvendor’s decision
variables are now p (regular price) and Q (quantity); these choices influence the consumers’ to-buy-
or-to-wait decisions. This model captures the strategic interaction between the newsvendor and
the consumers. With this model, we would like to characterize equilibrium outcomes (i.e., price,
quantity, and consumers’ purchase decisions).
The solution approach in this paper follows the rational expectations hypothesis, first proposed
by Muth (1961). It states that economic outcomes do not differ systematically from what people
expect them to be. Applying this concept to the present setting, we analyze the model above by
looking for Rational Expectations (RE) equilibria, which satisfy: (i) given their expectations of
future availability, consumers make their purchase (or waiting) decisions, (ii) given his expectations
of consumers’ willingness-to-pay, the newsvendor makes his pricing and stocking decisions, and (iii)
everyone’s expectations are consistent with actual outcomes. In this paper, we first derive the RE
equilibrium for the newsvendor model, and then extend the concept to the case of decentralized
supply chains. A decentralized supply chain consists of a single retailer and a single manufacturer.
In this case, we assume that a contractual agreement between them is exogenously specified up
front; this is consistent with the existing literature on supply chain contracting. Then the retailer
and consumers play the RE equilibrium. In this way, equilibrium outcomes under decentralization
can also be studied using our framework.
There are three main results in this paper. First, we show that when consumers are strategic,
a centralized supply chain may perform strictly worse than a decentralized supply chain. This is
because contrary to popular belief, double marginalization may benefit decentralized systems: a
reduced stocking quantity intensifies the threat of stock-outs and thus also increases consumers’
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willingness-to-pay. Centralized systems, however, are unable to impose similar threats, which are
not credible as they will not be fulfilled in RE equilibrium. This challenges the conventional wisdom
that centralized systems provide a gold standard for supply chains to strive for, because when
consumers are strategic, it is possible to surpass this benchmark.
Next, we propose two alternative benchmarks that serve as performance targets. We have already
seen that profits can be enhanced when firms use the threat of stock-outs to increase consumers’
willingness-to-pay; alternatively, another means to achieve the same end is to guarantee that future
prices will remain high. These two strategies (quantity-commitment and price-commitment, respec-
tively) induce consumers to purchase early at a higher price, by maintaining the exclusivity of
the product. In our analysis, we solve for the RE equilibrium between the consumers and the
newsvendor under price and quantity-commitment. We confirm that commitment power increases
profits, and that each form of commitment is preferred under different situations. These two com-
mitment benchmarks offer a fresh perspective on the design of decentralized supply chains: with
strategic customer behavior, instead of striving for centralized outcomes, we should work towards
the commitment outcomes.
Finally, we show that these performance targets can indeed be attained. By structuring appro-
priate contractual agreements between supply chain parties, decentralized systems can achieve the
price-commitment and quantity-commitment outcomes. In other words, supply contracts function
indirectly as commitment devices. We emphasize “indirectly” because firms do not (and often can
not) make any explicit promises to consumers (e.g., the promise by a firm not to mark down price
may not be credible because after the regular season, the firm has incentives to salvage the leftover
products at a lower price). Instead, they use contractual arrangements to “change the rules of the
game” so as to attain the desired equilibrium outcomes. From a mechanism design standpoint, it
is not surprising to find that as long as the class of admissible contractual mechanisms is large
enough, significantly better outcomes can be implemented. However, in our case, it turns out that
the following types of contracts are sufficient to implement the commitment outcomes: wholesale
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price contracts, buy-backs, markdown money, and sales rebates. In addition, we identify several fea-
tures of these contracts that are novel in the current setting with strategic consumers. For instance,
buy-backs serve to implement price-commitment whereas markdown money empowers the retailer
with quantity-commitment. Also, strategic consumer behavior sometimes imposes constraints on
how profits must be allocated between the supply chain parties.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a literature review.
Section 3 introduces our newsvendor model with strategic consumers and analyzes the value of
commitment. Sections 4 and 5 demonstrate how to attain our two profit benchmarks (under
quantity-commitment and price-commitment, respectively) using appropriate contractual mecha-
nisms. Section 6 considers several extensions, and Section 7 concludes.
2. Literature Review
When making a purchase decision, consumers choose from various alternatives, including the option
of delaying the purchase. For example, whether or not a consumer makes a purchase depends on
her expectations of what future prices will be. The forward-looking behavior of consumers has been
widely documented in the consumer behavior literature, for example, Jacobson and Obermiller
(1990), Krishna, Currim, and Shoemaker (1991), Krishna (1994), and Ho, Tang, and Bell (1998),
among others. This stream of research focuses on consumers’ impressions of retailers’ pricing pat-
terns and its impact on consumers’ purchasing decisions.
Given its prevalence and importance, strategic consumer behavior has been studied extensively
across various disciplines. There is a stream of research in economics and marketing that examines
durable goods markets with strategic consumers. This has been inspired by Coase (1972), who
showed that durable goods monopolists will end up earning zero profits because as long as prices are
above marginal cost, strategic consumers will anticipate and wait for price reductions. Bulow (1982)
contributes the important insight that a durable good monopolist prefers to rent his product rather
than to sell it, because this avoids the competition from second-hand markets operated primarily by
strategic consumers. Two recent studies that are most relevant to this paper are Desai, Koenigsberg,
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and Purohit (2004), and Arya and Mittendorf (2005), both of which compare centralized and
decentralized distribution channels for durable goods under strategic consumer behavior. Desai,
Koenigsberg, and Purohit show that under certain conditions, strategic decentralization through
the addition of a retailer in the distribution channel can increase a manufacturer’s profits, if the
manufacturer can commit to future wholesale prices with the retailer. Arya and Mittendorf show
that the benefits of decentralization are robust against changes in the manufacturer’s ability to
commit. Our paper is similar in spirit because we also find that a decentralized supply chain may
outperform a centralized one as a result of strategic consumer behavior, but we demonstrate this
finding in a different setting with seasonal products and stochastic demand (rather than durable
goods with deterministic demand).
Strategic consumer behavior has recently been studied by operations management researchers.
In particular, the literature on dynamic pricing of finite inventories is related to our paper. Aviv
and Pazgal (2005) study optimal pricing of a seasonal product with the presence of forward-looking
consumers. There is a single price reduction and the authors examine the optimal timing and
extent of discounts. Elmaghraby, Gulcu, and Keskinocak (2004) investigate optimal markdown
mechanisms in the presence of rational customers with multi-unit demands. Zhou, Fan, and Cho
(2005) analyze optimal customer responses when facing an exogenously specified dynamic pricing
policy. Gallien (2005) shows that the optimal prices should increase over time when selling a
finite inventory to customers arriving over an infinite horizon. Su (2005) considers a heterogenous
population of strategic as well as myopic customers, and shows that depending on the customer
composition, optimal price paths could involve either markups or markdowns. Yu, Kapuscinski,
and Ahn (2006) study advance selling with limited capacity under various demand scenarios. These
papers assume that the initial capacity is exogenously given, which differs from our model. van
Ryzin and Liu (2005) study quantity decisions instead of price decisions in a capacity rationing
model with strategic customers. Yin and Tang (2006) analyze a fashion retailer’s ordering decision
in a model where strategic customers arrive to the store according to a Poisson process and the
prices are announced before the selling season starts. They focus on the impact of two different
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display formats (display all vs. display one) on the seller’s expected profits. There are also papers
that consider strategic consumers in dynamic auction settings (see, e.g., Caldentey and Vulcano,
2004, and Gallien and Gupta, 2005). All the above papers only study the interaction between
strategic consumers and a single seller, while our paper also considers the vertical relationship
between manufacturers and retailers.
Our paper builds on the well-known newsvendor problem: find the optimal order quantity that
maximizes the seller’s expected profit under probabilistic demand. There have been several recent
developments of newsvendor model that are most relevant. Petruzzi and Dada (1999) summarize
and extend the newsvendor model literature with pricing decisions. In their model, the aggregate
demand is characterized as a function of the retail price together with a random shock. We also con-
sider pricing decisions for the retailer, but in our model individual consumers may react rationally
to the retailers’ ordering quantity as well as prices. Dana and Petruzzi (2001) study a newsven-
dor problem in which customer demand is dependent on both price and inventory level. In their
model, customers who visit the newsvendor forego an exogenous outside option (or equivalently,
they face a traveling cost). A higher likelihood of availability induces more customer visits and
stimulates demand. This yields a higher optimal stocking level for the newsvendor. In contrast,
in our model, strategic customer behavior leads to a lower optimal stocking level. This is because
strategic waiting by customers compromise the retailer’s ability to charge a high price in the regu-
lar selling season and a remedy for the retailer is to limit the ordering quantity so that customers
are discouraged from waiting for the sale. Cachon and Kok (2004) re-interpret the salvage price
as a market-clearing price. They endogenize the clearance pricing decision and focus on how to
estimate the salvage value from historical data. A literature review on newsvendor model and its
extensions can be found in Silver, Pyke, and Peterson (1998) & Khouja (1999).
There exists an enormous literature on supply chain contracting with a newsvendor retailer.
The focus is on how to design a contractual relationship between the retailer and supplier to
maximize supply chain efficiency. It has been shown that a variety of contracts can eliminate double
marginalization by aligning firms’ incentives. Some of the contracts can also split the supply chain
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profit arbitrarily between firms. For a detailed survey of the literature on supply chain contracting,
the readers are referred to Cachon (2003). It is worth pointing out that so far the customary practice
has been to use the centralized optimal solution as the benchmark to evaluate various contracts.
However, with the presence of strategic consumers, commitment becomes a critical issue in addition
to centralization and the centralized optimal solution benchmark may not be appropriate any more.
3. Newsvendor Model with Strategic Customers
3.1. Basic setup
This paper builds upon the newsvendor inventory model. There is a single seller who must determine
how many units of a product to stock. The seller faces a random demand X ≥ 0, which has
distribution F and density f . We assume that the demand distribution has an increasing failure
rate, that is, f(x)/(1− F (x)) is increasing in x; this assumption is satisfied by many commonly
observed distributions. For technical reasons, we also assume that f is continuous, has a connected
support, and f(0)> 0. Each unit of the product costs c but is valued by customers at v. That is,
v is customers’ utility from consuming the product. Leftover units can be sold in an exogenous
salvage market at s per unit. We assume that s < c< v.
Our model departs from the classic setup by introducing strategic customers. Specifically, cus-
tomers recognize that the product may become available on the salvage market at price s. In order
to maximize individual expected surplus, customers choose between buying immediately (at full
price) or waiting for the sale (at salvage price). If the regular selling price is too high, customers
may find it worthwhile to wait for the sale, even if the product may be sold out by then. Let r
denote customers’ reservation price or their willingness to pay in the regular selling season. Clearly,
there is r < v if there is a positive probability that customers can get the product at the lower
salvage price s. This setup can directly be compared against the standard newsvendor model, in
which the selling price is v and all customers buy at this price upon the realization of demand X.
We shall adopt the following sequence of events. First, the seller privately forms his beliefs
over customers’ reservation prices, and then optimally chooses the price and quantity given these
beliefs. We assume that customers may observe the selling price but not the stocking quantity.
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Then, customers privately form beliefs over their chances of obtaining the product on the salvage
market, and then form their reservation prices based on these beliefs. Next, the random demand X
is realized. Then, sales occur at the full price p (provided that the selling price p does not exceed
consumers’ reservation price r). Finally, all remaining units are sold at the salvage price s.
Based on this chronology, we first describe the consumer’s decision problem. Consider a particular
consumer who forms the belief that he will obtain the product with probability ξprob if he waits
for the sale. (Note that here a point estimate of the availability probability is sufficient since the
distribution of the possibles outcomes is binary: the product is either available or not). Based
on these expectations, the consumer’s expected surplus if he faces an actual regular price p is
max{v− p, (v− s)ξprob}. The first term is his surplus from buying at the regular price p, and the
second term is his expected surplus if he waits for the sale, where there is probability ξprob that
he earns surplus v− s and probability 1− ξprob that he earns zero surplus (if the product is out of
stock). Since the consumer chooses the more attractive option between buying and waiting, he will
buy at price p if and only if v− p≥ (v− s)ξprob. In other words, given his expectations ξprob, the
consumer’s reservation price for the product is r(ξprob) = v− (v− s)ξprob. For tractability, we make
the following two assumptions. First, we consider homogeneous customers who share the same
beliefs ξprob and the same reservation price r. Second, we assume that consumers are risk neutral
and they do not discount future payoffs. In Section 6 we relax these assumptions and consider more
elaborate models of consumer behavior to demonstrate the robustness of our results.
Next, we consider the seller’s decision problem. The two decisions are stocking quantity Q and
regular selling price p. Suppose that the seller expects that all customers have a reservation price ξr.
Given these beliefs, it is clear that he will choose price p= ξr and quantity Q(p) = argmaxQΠ(Q,p),
where Π(Q,p) = (p−s)E(X ∧Q)− (c−s)Q is the newsvendor profit function, which has an unique
maximizer. We use “∧” throughout the paper for the minimum operator. Notice that given beliefs
ξr, the seller is essentially considering facing a standard newsvendor problem with a fixed price.
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3.2. Rational expectations equilibrium
Definition 1. A rational-expectations equilibrium (p,Q, r, ξprob, ξr) satisfies the following:
(i) r= v− (v− s)ξprob, (ii) p= ξr, (iii) Q= argmaxQΠ(Q,p), (iv) ξprob = F (Q), (v) ξr = r.
Conditions (i), (ii), and (iii) assert that under expectations ξprob and ξr, the seller and all con-
sumers will rationally choose the appropriate utility-maximizing actions, as discussed above. The
final two conditions require that expectations must be consistent with outcomes. In (iv), the expec-
tations ξprob must concur with the actual probability of obtaining the product if an individual
consumer waits for the sale. This actual probability can be calculated as follows. In equilibrium,
the seller prices the product at consumers’ reservation price, so all consumers will buy the product.
Therefore, if an individual consumer waits instead, this consumer will obtain the product if and
only if X ≤ Q, which occurs with probability F (Q), as shown in (iv). Here, we have implicitly
assumed efficient rationing: customers who wait for the sale have the highest priority to receive
the product in the salvage market. This is reasonable because customers who are interested in
a particular product and eagerly waiting for a sale are also the ones who are more likely to get
the product when the sale actually takes place. Finally, in (v), the seller must correctly anticipate
consumers’ reservation price.
Notice that the conditions for a rational expectations (RE) equilibrium in Definition 1 can be
reduced to a pair of equations in p and Q only: p= v − (v − s)F (Q), and Q= argmaxQΠ(Q,p).
These two conditions will be used to explicitly characterize the RE equilibrium below.
Proposition 1. In the RE equilibrium, all consumers buy immediately, and the seller’s price
and quantity are characterized by pc = s+
√




All proofs are given in an online appendix. Here, we have used F to denote 1 − F , and the
subscript c in pc and Qc stands for “centralized” (since we are considering a centralized system
with a single seller). We will also use Πc to denote the seller’s profit under the RE equilibrium.
It is instructive to compare the equilibrium price and quantity in our model with that in the
classical newsvendor model, where customers are not strategic and are willing to pay their val-
uation v for the product (so the seller also charges v). In terms of price, the equilibrium price
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pc must lie between c and v, since pc − s is the geometric mean of v − s and c− s. Unsurpris-
ingly, strategic consumer behavior forces the seller to price below v. Next, in terms of quantity,
the equilibrium stocking quantity Qc is also lower than the optimal stocking quantity Q0 in the
standard newsvendor model. Observe that Q0 >Qc because F (Q0) = c−sv−s <
√
c−s
v−s = F (Qc). When
confronted with strategic customers, the seller lowers his stocking quantity. This is because the
seller hopes to increase customers’ willingness-to-pay by restricting the availability of the product
and maintaining an image of exclusivity. Generating scarcity and competition among buyers is
quite a natural strategy to adopt. It also arises in other contexts: for example, in auctions, an
increased number of bidders often induces more aggressive bidding behavior; see, e.g., Bulow and
Klemperer (1996) and Vulcano, van Ryzin, and Maglaras (2002).
3.3. Value of commitment
Can the seller do better than the RE equilibrium outcome described above? Yes, provided that he
is able to make binding commitments on his own actions. In this section, we consider two distinct
types of commitment power: quantity-commitment (keeping quantities low) and price-commitment
(keeping prices high). Practical examples of quantity-commitment include limited editions of cars,
furniture, and collectors’ items, while price-commitment may arise in the form of “one-price” or
“no-haggle” policies. Both strategies may increase the seller’s profits by guaranteeing to customers
that his product is sufficiently exclusive: it is not available in large quantities and it cannot be
purchased at low prices. The seller’s optimal profit levels under quantity-commitment and price-
commitment will be used as profit benchmarks for the remainder of our analysis.
We begin by discussing quantity-commitment. Suppose the seller has at his disposal some com-
mitment device, which convinces customers that exactly Q units of his product will be available
for the entire time horizon of relevance. This commitment device could take the form of advertis-
ing campaigns, long-term reputation concerns, or supply-side constraints, but we do not model it
explicitly. Given that Q units are available, customers no longer need to form rational expectations
ξprob because they know for sure that if they wait for the sale (while all other customers buy),
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their chances of getting the product on the salvage market is F (Q). In other words, when the seller
commits to sell Q units, customers are willing to pay (and the seller also charges) price p(Q) =
v− (v−s)F (Q). Given this selling price, the seller’s profits, as a function of the quantity Q that he
commits to, is Πq(Q) = (p(Q)−s)E(X∧Q)−(c−s)Q= (v−s)F (Q)E(X∧Q)−(c−s)Q. The seller
will thus stock the optimal quantity Q∗q = argmaxQΠq(Q) and charge price p∗q = v− (v− s)F (Q∗q),
and the corresponding optimal profit level under quantity-commitment is denoted Π∗q ; the sub-
script q stands for “quantity-commitment.” Here, quantity-commitment allows the seller to actively
manipulate the selling price p(Q) as a function of the chosen quantity Q; on the other hand, in the
absence of quantity-commitment, the price p is determined by equilibrium rational expectations.
Lemma 1. Πq(Q) has a unique maximizer Q∗q.
We next compare the quantity-commitment optimal outcome with the RE equilibrium outcome.
Proposition 2. (i) Q∗q ≤Qc and Π∗q ≥Πc.
(ii) For fixed s and v, there exist thresholds cl and ch (cl ≤ ch) such that Π∗q −Πc is decreasing
in c for c≤ cl and c≥ ch.
(iii) For fixed c and s, there exist thresholds vl and vh (vl ≤ vh) such that Π∗q −Πc is increasing
in v for v≤ vl and v≥ vh.
Result (i) in Proposition 2 confirms our earlier statement that quantity-commitment enhances
seller’s profits. This is done by committing to a stocking quantity Q∗q that is lower than the RE
equilibrium Qc. Recall that in the RE equilibrium, the seller has already restricted availability
by stocking at a level Qc that is lower than the corresponding quantity Q0 in the absence of
strategic customers. Our current result tells us that the seller can do better by limiting his available
quantities even further. Indeed, creating artificial shortages is not an uncommon practice. For
instance, Zara, one of the largest Spanish fashion retailers, is well-known for limiting production
quantities to induce customers to pay the regular selling prices (Ferdows, Lewis, and Machuca,
2005). Furthermore, popular toys and electronic gadgets routinely go out of stock every holiday
season (see Wingfield and Guth, 2005). In these cases, scarcity also serves as a marketing tool in
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generating hype and allure, which further increases the desirability of the product. Results (ii) and
(iii) characterize the impact of model parameters on the value of commitment. They suggest that
quantity commitment tends to be more valuable as the product becomes more profitable (either v
increases or c decreases).
We stress that an external commitment device is critical in realizing the optimal quantity Q∗q .
The seller’s promises, by themselves, are not credible, because when the seller lacks a commitment
device, the quantity Q∗q cannot be sustained in a RE equilibrium. To see this, note from Definition
1 that in order to sustain Q∗q in equilibrium, the required expectations are ξprob = F (Q∗q) and ξr = r,
and the required selling and reservation prices are p= r= v− (v−s)F (Q∗q). This set of values is the
only candidate that satisfy conditions (i), (ii), (iv), and (v) in Definition 1, but with these values,
the remaining condition (iii) contradicts the definition of Q∗q . Intuitively, this means that the seller
has an incentive to deviate from stocking the quantity Q∗q once the market believes in it, so these
expectations will not be formed in the first place. Specifically, under the expectations that only Q∗q
is available, customers would be willing to pay p(Q∗q), but once customers are willing to pay this
much, it is in the seller’s interests to raise the stocking level above Q∗q , so the initial expectations of
Q∗q would have been inconsistent and cannot be part of a RE equilibrium. However, this problem
vanishes if the seller possesses some external commitment device.
Next, we turn to price-commitment. Suppose that the seller can credibly commit to future prices
after demand has been realized. It is sufficient to consider the case in which the seller commits to
maintain ex-post prices at exactly v. (If guaranteed ex-post prices are strictly between v and s,
the seller can do better by instead promising v because this decreases customers’ option value of
waiting and increases their willingness-to-pay; if the guaranteed ex-post price is s, it is as good
as none since we are back to the RE equilibrium.) Now, committing to maintain prices at v is
equivalent to eliminating the markdown opportunity provided by the salvage market. If these
promises were credible, customers will be willing to pay v at the start. Therefore, under price-
commitment, our model reduces to the standard newsvendor model (with zero salvage value).
The seller charges p∗p = v and his profit function is Πp(Q) = vE(X ∧Q)− cQ. The optimal selling
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quantity is Q∗p = argmaxQΠp(Q) and the optimal profit level is Π∗p. Here, the subscript p stands for
“price-commitment.” The following proposition compares the performance of price commitment to
the RE equilibrium outcome.
Proposition 3. (i) For fixed s and v, there is a threshold cl such that Π∗p ≥Πc for c≤ cl and
there is a threshold ch such that Π∗p ≤Πc for c≥ ch. In addition, there exist thresholds cˆ such that
Π∗p−Πc is decreasing in c for c≤ cˆ.
(ii) For fixed c and s, there exists a threshold vl such that Π∗p ≤ Πc for v ≤ vl and there is a
threshold value vh such that Π∗p ≥ Πc for v ≥ vh. In addition, there exist thresholds vˆ such that
Π∗p−Πc is increasing in v for v≥ vˆ.
Proposition 3 shows that price-commitment may increase the seller’s profits above the RE equi-
librium level. Specifically, the inequality Π∗p ≥ Πc holds when the production cost c is relatively
low and when the valuation v is relatively high. However, there also exist situations where Π∗p <
Πc. Therefore, unlike quantity-commitment, price-commitment is not unambiguously beneficial.
Proposition 3 also sheds light on when price commitment is valuable: under certain conditions,
price commitment tends to be more valuable when the product becomes more profitable (either v
increases or c decreases).
For the remainder of this section, we compare quantity-commitment and price-commitment.
Proposition 4.
(i) For fixed c and v, there is a threshold sˆ≥ 0 such that Π∗q ≥Π∗p if and only if s≥ sˆ.
(ii) For fixed c and s, there is a threshold vl such that Π∗q ≥Π∗p for v ≤ vl and there is a threshold
value vh such that Π∗p ≥Π∗q for v≥ vh.
This result states that quantity-commitment is preferred over price-commitment when customer
valuation v is low and the salvage value s is high (i.e., both are close to production cost c). One
interpretation, as follows, draws upon the comparison between mass and niche markets. Quantity-
commitment is preferred in mass markets: in these environments, the product is tailored to the
average consumer and there is ample salvage opportunities (so v and s are close together). On the
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other hand, there are also niche markets, which target specific high-end customer segments, but the
resulting degree of customization may constrain the transfer of the product to alternative sources
of demand (so v and s are far apart); under these conditions, price-commitment is preferred.
Quantity-commitment and price-commitment are both desirable strategies that sometimes arise
in practice. However, in most situations, these strategies may not be feasible because the seller
lacks an appropriate commitment device. In this case, what can the seller do? Our analysis thus
far suggests that the seller would have to contend with the RE equilibrium outcome. This may be
true in a centralized system (single seller), but not for decentralized systems. In the next sections,
we show that contractual arrangements between supply chain parties can serve as a surrogate
commitment device, so as to attain the optimal profit benchmarks Π∗q and Π∗p with commitment.
As a result, a decentralized supply chain may yield higher profits than a centralized supply chain.
4. Achieving Quantity Commitment in Decentralized Supply Chains
In the previous section, customers purchase the product from a single seller. This section extends
the newsvendor model to a supply chain setting. That is, we consider a manufacturer distributing a
product through a retailer. In this context, we interpret c as the manufacturer’s production cost, s
as the retailer’s salvage value, and v and X characterize market demand in the same way as before.
The sequence of events is as follows: first, the contractual agreements between the manufacturer
and the retailer are exogenously established; then, the retailer and customers make their pricing,
stocking, and purchase decisions according to a RE equilibrium; finally, demand is realized during
the selling season and unsold products are salvaged. In this decentralized setting, we assume that
the manufacturer and the retailer are independent firms acting according to their own interests.
Our goal is to design supply contracts so as to attain the profit benchmarks of a centralized system
with quantity-commitment, Π∗q .
We begin by analyzing the simplest contract: a pure wholesale price contract. Then, we will
also analyze markdown allowances, buybacks, and linear sales rebates. These contracts are widely
used and relatively simple to analyze (since payments depend linearly on quantities). We demon-
strate that under appropriate contractual parameters, the decentralized supply chain can attain
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the quantity-commitment benchmark Π∗q .
4.1. Wholesale price contracts
A wholesale price contract specifies the unit price w (w≥ c) the manufacturer charges the retailer.
We assume that the wholesale price w is determined through some negotiation process between the
manufacturer and the retailer, which is beyond the scope of this paper. However, we may consider
w a proxy of firms’ relative bargaining power: a higher w reflects a more favorable position for the
manufacturer. See Cachon (2003) for more discussion about wholesale price contracts.
Under a wholesale price contract, the retailer’s profit function is Πrw(Q,p) = (p− s)E(X ∧Q)−
(w − s)Q. Here, the subscript w stands for “wholesale price” and the superscript r stands for
“retailer.” (Later, we will use the superscript m to refer to the manufacturer’s profit function.) The
RE equilibrium between the retailer and the consumers is derived similarly as before. Therefore,
following the argument of Proposition 1, the retailer’s order quantity Qw and retail price pw in RE
equilibrium is given by F (Qw) = w−spw−s =
√
w−s
v−s , and pw = s+(v− s)F (Qw) = s+
√
(v− s)(w− s).
In this RE equilibrium, the profits to the retailer and the manufacturer are given respectively
by Πrw = (pw − s)E(X ∧ Qw) − (w − s)Qw = (v − s)F (Qw)E(X ∧ Qw) − (v − s)F
2
(Qw)Qw and
Πmw =Qw(w− c) =Qw[(v− s)F
2
(Qw)− (c− s)], and total supply chain profits are Πw ≡Πrw+Πmw =
(v− s)F (Qw)E(X ∧Qw)− (c− s)Qw.
Observe that the wholesale price w can be used as a control lever for the supply chain to induce a
particular equilibrium stocking quantity. The reasoning is as follows. Since the equilibrium quantity
Qw is decreasing in w, there is a one-to-one relationship between Qw ∈ [0,Qc] and w ∈ [c, v]. (Recall
that Qc is the RE equilibrium quantity in the centralized system.) Therefore, by varying w between
c and v, the system can realize any equilibrium quantity within the corresponding range. Although
this particular quantity has to conform to the requirements of an RE equilibrium, it is as if the
supply chain could specify it at the outset. In this sense, a simple wholesale price contract provides
the supply chain with some degree of quantity-commitment power.
To emphasize the dependence of these equilibrium quantities on the wholesale price w, we some-
times write Qw(w), pw(w),Πrw(w),Πmw (w),Πw(w). It turns out that quantity-commitment power
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can significantly enhance supply chain profits. This is made precise in the next proposition, which
follows from Lemma 1 and Proposition 2.
Proposition 5. There exists some w∗ ∈ (c, v) such that:
(i) For every w ∈ (c,w∗], equilibrium total profits in the decentralized system under the wholesale
price contract w exceed equilibrium profits in the centralized system, that is, Πw(w)≥Πc.
(ii) The wholesale price contract w = w∗ enables the decentralized system to achieve the optimal
profit under quantity commitment Π∗q.
This is a surprising result: Proposition 5(i) states that the profit of a centralized supply chain
is dominated by the profits of a decentralized supply chain, under an array of wholesale price
contracts. In this paper, by “centralized” we mean the supply chain is controlled by a central
planner who wishes to maximize the entire supply chain’s profit. It has been a customary practice
to use centralized management as a benchmark to study channel efficiency in the operations and
marketing literature. Proposition 5(i) delivers a message that the centralized optimal profit may
not always be the highest possible profit that a supply chain can achieve. In particular, there have
been numerous studies addressing the inefficiency caused by double marginalization: i.e., when
w > c, the retailer orders less than the optimal quantity for the entire supply chain. In contrast,
we present a model in which increasing the wholesale price beyond c actually improves the supply
chain’s profit. The reason is that a higher wholesale price will enable the retailer to charge a higher
retail price to forward-looking consumers in equilibrium, and varying the wholesale price only alters
the transfer payment between the supply chain members.
Proposition 5(ii) goes one step further. It states that a decentralized supply chain can achieve
Π∗q , the optimal profit under the quantity commitment, by using a wholesale price contract w=w∗.
This wholesale price induces the optimal quantity Q∗q in equilibrium. A similar situation where a
wholesale price contract can coordinate a supply chain is when horizontal competition is present.
For example, Netessine and Zhang (2005) demonstrate that in a distribution channel with a man-
ufacturer and multiple retailers, the substitution effect among the retailers can offset the double
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marginalization effect and thus retain the supply chain optimal outcome. The driving forces under-
lying our model are different: we have strategic consumers on top of double marginalization, and
a wholesale price contract can serve as a coordination device to balance these two opposite forces.
Although the wholesale price contract w∗ allows the supply chain to attain the profit benchmark
Π∗q , it enforces a particular division of profits between the retailer and the manufacturer (their
shares are Πrw(w∗) and Πmw (w∗) respectively). Yet, each individual party may prefer some wholesale
price other than w∗ and may negotiate for their preferences. Since it may not be possible for both
parties to agree upon the wholesale price w∗, it now becomes important to understand each party’s
preferences over alternative wholesale prices.
We proceed by asking the following two questions. First, if given the choice, what wholesale
price would the retailer and the manufacturer select? In other words, how are the quantities wr ∈
argmaxwΠrw(w) and wm ∈ argmaxwΠmw (w) characterized, and are they unique? Second, how do
these unilaterally-preferred wholesale prices wr and wm compare with the system-optimal wholesale
price w∗? The following lemma deals with these questions.
Lemma 2. (i) The maximizers wr and wm are unique. (ii) wr <w∗ <wm.
Consistent with this result, Figure 1 shows a numerical example with the retailer, manufacturer,
and supply chain profit functions (against wholesale price w) and their maximizers.
We are interested in characterizing the set of Pareto optimal wholesale price contracts. A contract
is Pareto optimal if there exists no alternative such that some firm is strictly better off and no firm
is worse off. We have the next proposition, which follows from Lemmas 1 and 2.
Proposition 6. The set of Pareto optimal wholesale price contracts is w ∈ [wr,wm]. In partic-
ular, if wr > c, then the wholesale price w= c is Pareto dominated by any w ∈ [c,wr].
The proposition sheds some light on how the allocation of bargaining power affects supply chain
efficiency: since wr < w∗ < wm, the supply chain optimum is achieved somewhere in the middle,
and any extreme allocation of bargaining power is not good for the supply chain. This in contrast
with some of the existing results in the literature. With wholesale price contracts, Lariviere and
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Figure 1 Comparison of the profit functions (demand follows a normal distribution N(100,400) and parameter
values are c= 4.5, s= 4, and v= 8).
Porteus (2001) acknowledge that an increase in retail power can improve supply chain performance.
When studying the pull contracts (i.e., the retailer chooses the wholesale price and orders only as
needed during the selling season), Cachon (2004) finds that the opposite is true: increasing the
supplier’s bargaining power (in the form of a higher minimum profit requirement) would increase
supply chain efficiency. Our model provides a more balanced view by noting that a well-balanced
bargaining power may achieve the most efficient outcome for a supply chain. Now, consider the
following question: if the retailer has absolute bargaining power, will it offer a wholesale price
w= c and squeeze the manufacturer’s profit to zero? Not necessarily. Note that the problem faced
by the retailer with varying wholesale price w is equivalent to the problem faced by the single
seller with varying production cost c. If we view the seller’s profit Πc as a function of c, then wr
is essentially the production cost that maximizes the seller’s profit. Therefore, if wr > c (i.e., the
profit-maximizing production cost is greater than the actual cost), then the contract with w= c is
Pareto dominated by any w ∈ [c,wr] (such as in Figure 1). That is, under certain conditions, both
the retailer and the manufacturer may prefer a higher wholesale price. The fact that the retailer
may voluntarily invite a higher wholesale price is quite interesting.
4.2. Markdown money contracts
We now study markdown money contracts. Apart from realizing the profit benchmark Π∗q in decen-
tralized systems, they also offer additional flexibility in that they permit arbitrary profit allocations.
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With a markdown money contract the manufacturer charges the retailer a unit price wm, but
pays the retailer m per unit salvaged at the end of the season. We require wm− s−m≥ 0 because
otherwise the retailer will order an infinite quantity. Such a contract has been widely observed in
the retail industry and m is called markdown money.
Another related class of contracts is sales rebates. Suppose that the manufacturer sells to the
retailer at a wholesale price wr but as an incentive to generate sales, offers to pay r for each
unit sold at regular price. Now, observe that a markdown money contract (wm,m) with m< 0 is
equivalent to a sales rebate contract with wr =wm+ |m| and r= |m|. In other words, rather than
interpreting m< 0 as a penalty for not selling, we may see it as a reward for selling. We emphasize
that our analysis allows for m < 0; the only required condition is wm − s−m ≥ 0 as explained
above. When the need arises, we use the terminology positive markdown contracts (m ≥ 0) and
sales rebates (m< 0) to distinguish between the two cases; otherwise, we generally use “markdown
money contracts” to refer to both cases.
Under a markdown money contract, the retailer’s profit function is Πrm(Q,p) = (p−s−m)E(X ∧
Q)− (wm − s−m)Q. Here, the subscript m stands for “markdown money”. The RE equilibrium
between the retailer and the consumers is derived similarly as before: the retailer’s order quantity
Qm and retail price pm satisfy F (Qm) = wm−s−mpm−s−m , and pm = s+(v− s)F (Qm).
Next, we show that markdown money contracts can achieve the profit benchmark Π∗q , while
splitting total profits arbitrarily between the manufacturer and the retailer. Let λ denote the
retailer’s profit share that the supply chain wishes to realize. Next, let λ∗ denote the retailer’s profit
share under the wholesale price contract attaining Π∗q , and let w∗ and p∗ denote the corresponding
wholesale and retail prices. With this additional notation, we have the following proposition.













(p∗− s), the optimal profit under quantity commitment Π∗q is achieved and
the retailer’s share is λΠ∗q.
Markdown money contracts represent an improvement over the wholesale price contracts in
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Section 4.1 because the former can attain the quantity-commitment benchmark Π∗q while allocating
profits arbitrarily. However, with markdown money contracts, the manufacturer needs to verify the
number of salvaged units, and this might give rise to additional monitoring costs. Nevertheless,
a powerful member in the supply chain may still prefer a profit allocation scheme other than
the one resulting from w∗q (i.e., the wholesale price contract yielding Π∗q). It is well-known in the
operations literature that markdown money contracts can coordinate supply chains and allocate
total profits arbitrarily. Such a result continues to hold in our model with strategic customers when
quantity-commitment is desirable.
In terms of implementation, it is useful to check whether we need a positive markdown money
contract or a sales rebate contract. The following proposition provides the answer.
Proposition 8. Suppose we wish to attain the profit benchmark Π∗q while allocating a fraction








∗ ≥w∗ and m= (1− λ
λ∗
)
(p∗− s). (ii) When λ> λ∗, we can use a sales











This result indicates that when using markdown money contracts, the wholesale price (whether
wm or wr) is at least as large as the pure wholesale price w∗ attaining Π∗q . In other words, in return
for offering markdown allowances (or sales rebates), manufacturers charge higher wholesale prices.
Indeed, it is not surprising that many retailers perceive markdown money as “getting their money
back” (see Hurlbut, 2005).
Proposition 8 also reveals that although both positive markdowns and sales rebates can be used
to attain the profit benchmark Π∗q , the former allocates a smaller share to the retailer. Specifically,
using positive markdowns to attain Π∗q imposes a profit cap of λ∗Π∗q on the retailer, and using sales
rebates imposes a profit cap of (1−λ∗)Π∗q on the manufacturer. Therefore, our model suggests that
a strong manufacturer (when λ is small) should offer positive markdown money, whereas a strong
retailer (when λ is large) should demand sales rebates. For example, in practice, positive markdowns
are often offered by luxury fashion designers; however, whether the division of bargaining power in
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this example agrees with our predictions is an open empirical question.
Nevertheless, positive markdown allowances appear to be the norm in today’s retail environment,
despite the presence of increasingly dominant retailers. Since strong retailer power is incompatible
with the cap on their profits (under positive markdown allowances), our analysis suggests that
internal discord may arise. Indeed, the recent controversy over markdown money has sparked several
heated arguments between retailers and their suppliers (see Rozhon, 2005). On one hand, retailers
are demanding substantial amounts of markdown money from their suppliers and threatening not
to place orders for the upcoming season if the suppliers do not pay. On the other hand, suppliers
accuse retailers of marking down items more aggressively than necessary and refuse to share their
burden of lost margins. From a practical viewpoint, it would be interesting to see whether adopting
sales rebates (rather than markdown allowances) would ease this tension in the retail sector.
5. Achieving Price Commitment in Decentralized Supply Chains
In this section, we show that decentralized supply chains can attain the price-commitment bench-
mark profit Π∗p using buyback contracts. Under these contracts, the manufacturer sells to the
retailer at wholesale price wb and agrees to buy back unsold items at b per unit after demand is
realized. However, they do not allow an arbitrary division of profits.
5.1. Buyback contracts
There are two separate cases to consider. When b < s, the retailer would be better off directing
excess inventory into his salvage market rather than selling them back to the manufacturer. The
buyback option is as good as none, and the (wb, b) contract reduces to a pure wholesale contract,
which has already been studied above. Therefore, our study of buyback contracts focuses on the case
where b≥ s. In this case, the option of selling excess inventory back to the manufacturer becomes
more attractive than marking down the price. Remarkably, this buyback provision eliminates the
salvage market, thereby inducing all customers to pay the maximum regular price of v. We stress
that this is possible only if excess inventory is actually delivered back to the manufacturer (or
disposed of). Mere monetary transfers are insufficient because the retailer has to “burn his own
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bridge” in order to convince customers that he is unable to activate his salvage market after all intra-
supply-chain transactions have occurred. Like the monitoring costs associated with a markdown
money contract, there are also costs for implementing a buyback contract: for example, shipping
costs for returns or costs for disposing the unsold products. However, these costs are assumed to
be negligible because including them does not generate any additional insights.
Observe that buyback contracts resemble the markdown money contracts studied in Section
4.2. The only difference lies in whether goods are physically returned to the manufacturer. While
most studies in the operations literature overlook this difference, we emphasize its importance
in achieving price-commitment. In addition, our model highlights two other differences. First,
markdown allowances are used to achieve quantity-commitment but buybacks are used to achieve
price-commitment. Second, markdown money contracts can allocate profits arbitrarily between
supply chain members while buybacks can not.
We now proceed with the analysis. Suppose that a buyback contract (wb, b) with b≥ s has been
established at the outset. In this environment, the RE equilibrium (between the retailer and the
strategic customers) dictates that prices (selling price, reservation price, anticipated reservation
price) are all p = r = ξr = v and the anticipated probability of low-price availability is ξprob = 0.
Then, the retailer faces the profit function Πrb(Q) = (v− b)E(X ∧Q)− (wb− b)Q and chooses the
quantity Qrb satisfying F (Qrb) = (wb−b)/(v−b). Here, the subscript b stands for “buyback.” We also
define Πmb (Q) and Πb(Q) = Πrb(Q) + Πmb (Q) as the manufacturer’s profits and total supply chain
profits (under the buyback contract), as a function of the retailer’s order quantity Q. These profit
functions, respectively, are Πmb (Q) = bE(X∧Q)+(wb−c−b)Q and Πb(Q) = vE(X∧Q)−cQ. Total
supply chain profit Πb(Q) is maximized at Qb satisfying F (Qb) = c/v. Observe that total supply
chain profits under the buyback contract Πb(Q) coincides with the profit function of the centralized
system with price-commitment, Πp(Q), so their maximizers also coincide. Therefore, if the supply
chain can be coordinated to produce and stock the optimal quantity Qb, the price-commitment
profit benchmark Π∗p can be attained. The next proposition shows that this can indeed be done,
but only for a certain range of profit allocations.
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Proposition 9. Let λ ∈ [0,1 − s
v
]. Under the buyback contract wb = λc + (1 − λ)v, and b =
(1− λ)v, the RE equilibrium outcome attains the price-commitment profit benchmark Π∗p for the
system. Further, the retailer’s profit is λΠ∗p and the manufacturer’s profit is (1−λ)Π∗p.
Our results identify a new role that buyback contracts play when customers are strategic: they
serve as a commitment device. The ability to commit to strategic customers, combined with the
ability to coordinate on mutually beneficial actions, allows supply chains to attain the profit levels
of a centralized system with price-commitment. This may not even be an alternative when a
centralized seller operates in isolation. Industry evidence seems to be consistent with the above
analysis. For example, buyback or return policies are widely used in the book industry. Instead
of marking down prices, major retailers such as Barnes & Noble return the unsold books to their
publishers when the selling season ends. The returned copies are then sold to companies specializing
in bargain books, or, books that cannot be sold are simply pulped for a total loss. There is an on-
going debate in the book industry over whether returns should be eliminated: while some retailers
claim that they are willing to mark down books and sell them on spot, most publishers are leery of
the change (see Trachtenberg, 2005). In fact, one major concern is that readers may learn to wait
until books are cheaper. We suspect that the book industry, in spite of losses due to returns, may
still be using such a practice as a price-commitment device in order to extract higher profits.
As Proposition 9 illustrates, buyback contracts impose an upper bound of 1− s
v
on the retailer’s
profit share. Typically, the ability to allocate profits arbitrarily between parties is an important
criterion in evaluating different contractual formats. The possibility of arbitrary profit allocations
separates the coordination process from the allocation process: the supply chain can concentrate
on maximizing the size of the pie before negotiating over individual shares. In the current case, the
upper bound on retailer share may create problems, especially when the retailer is powerful relative
to the manufacturer. In an era with retailers becoming increasingly dominant (see Messinger and
Narasimhan, 1995 & Bloom and Perry, 2001), it has become difficult to use buyback contracts as a
price-commitment device when retailers actively negotiate against the profit cap imposed on them
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by optimal buyback agreements. Yet, ironically, it is precisely these profit caps (due to condition
b≥ s) that make buybacks effective in providing price-commitment. The inevitable consequence is
that attaining price-commitment via buyback arrangements may no longer be feasible.
Another limitation of using buyback contracts to achieve price-commitment is renegotiation.
Buyback contracts are ex-ante agreements to limit ex-post total profits to zero, but they are not
renegotiation-proof as long as there exists ex-post opportunities to reap positive profits. When the
buyback contract is prone to renegotiation, it can no longer provide credible price-commitment.
Recently there have been several studies looking at the issue of renegotiation in supply chains, for
instance, Iyer and Villa-Boas (2003) & Plambeck and Taylor (2004).
Finally, we close this section with the observation that more attractive alternatives may exist.
So far, we have lauded the use of the buyback contract because of its ability to achieve price-
commitment. Now, consider the following alternative. Rather than negotiating a buyback contract
with the upstream manufacturer, the retailer contracts with customers instead. Specifically, the
retailer may mitigate consumers’ price risk by offering to reimburse the difference if prices fall in the
future. Under this agreement, consumers are willing to pay v at the outset and the retailer should
mark prices down to s if and only if x/Q≤ s/v (i.e., the proportion of inventory Q sold is less than
s/v). It can be shown that supply chain profits will be vE(X∧Q)−cQ+∫ sQ/v
0
(sQ−vx)dF (x). The
last term reflects incremental profits from the opportunity to make an ex-post markdown decision,
which is always better than making an ex-ante commitment not to mark down. Indeed, this profit
function is always greater than the price-commitment profit function Πp(Q); similar comparisons
have been made by Png (1991). Therefore, although buybacks can be designed to provide price-
commitment, there exists alternatives (e.g., price protection arrangements) that perform better.
6. Extensions and discussion
6.1. Heterogeneous valuations
In the preceding analysis, we have assumed that all customers place the same valuation v on the
product. Now, suppose that the customer pool is heterogeneous and indexed by θ ∈ [0,1]. For
each type θ, there is an associated valuation vθ, which is increasing in θ. That is, a higher type is
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associated with a higher valuation. Assume that the range of valuations is [v0, v1] and c < v0. Let
G(θ) denote the proportion of customers of type θ and below (i.e., customers with valuations not
exceeding vθ). As before, the total demand X follows distribution F . Within this more complex
environment, how would our earlier techniques and results change?
In the appendix, we extend the RE equilibrium concept to accommodate heterogeneous cus-
tomers and present techniques for deriving the equilibrium. In particular, Lemma EC.1 in the
appendix proves that in a RE equilibrium, there exists a threshold type θp (correponding to the
seller’s price p) such that customers of type θp and above will buy immdediately while the rest
of customers will wait. Therefore, by choosing the price p, the seller is essentially choosing the
segment of customers who will buy immediately. In this way, apart from quantity decisions, the
seller also faces the task of finding the optimal price p∗ that yields maximum profit. Notice how
this is similar to the homogeneous customer case: with homogeneous customers, the optimal price
must be equal to customers’ reservation price, which is the same for all customers; while with het-
erogeneous customers, the buyer faces a continuous range of reservation prices and she can choose
the marginal type who will buy immediately.
Next we describe the seller’s problem. For a chosen p, the marginal customer type θp satisfies

















probability in the salvage market given that the seller has chosen Q and all customers above θp
will purchase immediately. That is, type θp customers are indifferent between buying now and
waiting. Note that in equilibrium, Q should maximize the seller’s expected profit Π(Q,p) = (p−






p−s . Together, we know that the
marginal valuation vθp is given by vθp = s+
(p−s)2
c−s . Thus, the seller’s pricing problem can be written
as maxpΠ(p) = (p− s)E[(G¯(θp)X)∧Q)]− (c− s)Q, where both Q and θp are functions of p.
Suppose the seller wishes to sell to customers with types θ and above (or customers with valuation
vθ or above), then she may do so using the RE equilibrium price pc and quantity Qc derived
from the analysis of a homogenous market with valuation vθ and size G¯(θ)X. That is, for any
price p chosen by the seller in a heterogeneous market, one may construct a homogeneous market
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which yields the same outcome for the seller. In this sense, one may expect that the results that
hold for each homogeneous market should remain largely unchanged in this heterogeneous market.
However, the model with heterogeneous customer valuations is less tractable due to the presence of
two distribution functions F (for market size) and G (for customer valuations). Nonetheless, in the
numerical examples presented in the online appendix, we find that the key insight from this paper
is still true: with strategic customers, double marginalization may improve supply chain efficiency.
Therefore, simplified settings with homogenous customers, as analyzed earlier, are representative
of the strategic interactions that take place in a heterogeneous world.
6.2. Discount factor
Suppose that consumers use a discount factor of δ ∈ [0,1] on end-of-season payoffs. Then, given that
the anticipated probability of availability is ξprob, the consumer’s expected surplus from waiting
for a sale is now δξprob(v − s) instead of ξprob(v − s) as before. This implies that the consumer’s
reservation price would be r= v− δξprob(v− s).
In the centralized case, the RE equilibrium quantity Qδ is now characterized by δF
2
(Qδ)+ (1−
δ)F (Qδ) = c−sv−s . Observe that when δ = 1, we have F (Qδ) =
√
c−s
v−s , which agrees with Proposition
1. On the other hand, when δ = 0, we have F (Qδ) = c−sv−s , which is intuitive since setting δ = 0
eliminates the viability of the salvage market, so consumers never wait for the sale and we return
to the standard newsvendor model. As δ increases from 0 to 1, consumers become more patient and
the effect of strategic behavior becomes more salient: equilibrium price and quantity both decrease,
as is necessary to encourage start-of-season purchases, and this leads to lower seller profits.
In the decentralized case, time discounting also does not affect the qualitative nature of our
results. Contractual agreements can still be used to attain the price-commitment and quantity-
commitment outcomes. However, since Π∗p is independent of δ whereas Π∗q decreases as δ increases,
increased consumer patience (higher δ) creates a bias in favor of price-commitment.
There are at least two alternative interpretations of the discount factor. First, the same construc-
tion above can be used to capture risk aversion. Some consumers are willing to pay a risk premium
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on end-of-season surplus as it involves the risk of stockouts, so they adopt a discount factor of
δ < 1. On the other hand, risk-seeking preferences would require δ > 1. The second alternative
interpretation of the discount factor involves estimation errors. If consumers consistently under-
estimate availability, we can model this using δ < 1; analogously, we can use δ > 1 to represent
over-estimation.
6.3. Customer arrival process
Our basic model is an extension of the newsvendor setup and we use a single random variable to
capture one-shot demand. In reality, it would be more natural to assume that customers arrive over
time. Since our focus is on supply chain contracting issues, we abstract from dynamic pricing and
continue to assume that the seller may charge at most two different prices: a regular season price,
and a markdown price after all customers have arrived. As before, each customer’s buy-or-wait
decision depends on the comparison between the product price and the customer’s reservation price.
Since both these are independent of the sequence of customer arrivals, the equilibrium outcome of
this game as well as our earlier results remain unchanged.
Further, suppose that customers have discounted valuations, i.e., a later arrival is associated
with a lower valuation for the product. Assume the range of customer valuations is [v0, v1], i.e.,
the first arrival has a valuation v1 and the last arrival has a valuation v0. Then we go back to the
heterogeneous model discussed in Section 6.1: arrival time can be used to index the customers (θ
is the arrival time) and the corresponding distribution function G can be constructed using the
dynamic arrival process. From the discussion in Section 6.1, our main insights remain unchanged.
6.4. Endogenous salvage price
So far we have assumed a constant salvage value s. This enables us to study the impact of strategic
customer behavior on the classic newsvendor model, as well as the impact on supply chain con-
tracting. However, more generally, there may be price effects on the salvage market. To capture
price effects on the salvage market, suppose that the salvage price s is a decreasing function of
the number of left-over units Ql, denoted by s (Ql). As a benchmark for comparison, we consider
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s= s(0)< c in our basic model. Then with endogenous salvage value s(Ql), increasing the seller’s
quantity Q has a two-fold effect: first, it will increase product availability in the salvage market;
second, it will decrease the salvage price s(Ql) since Ql will be stochastically larger. Note that
only the first effect exists in the basic model with s= s(0). Thus in the model with endogenous
salvage value s(Ql), customers would have more incentive to wait, compared to in the basic model
with a constant salvage price s(0). As a result, the seller’s optimal quantity would be even lower.
This implies that the effect of strategic customer behavior will be stronger when we consider price
effects on the salvage market.
6.5. Bargain-hunters and price-takers
So far, our analysis assumes that all customers are strategic bargain-hunters and may wait for end-
of-season sales. In reality, there may be a segment of price-taking customers who do not consider
the possibility of waiting for a sale. They either purchase the product at regular price (if it is below
their valuation) or leave the market; we refer to them as myopic. To improve realism, we may
consider both strategic and myopic customers. Let φ and φ= 1−φ denote the fraction of strategic
and myopic consumers, and we continue to assume that all consumers have valuation v.
The introduction of myopic consumers presents sellers with a choice over two alternatives. The
first alternative, as before, is to choose a regular price at which all consumers (both strategic and
myopic) are willing to buy; this brings us back to the previous analysis. The second alternative is
to price the product at v and sell only to myopic consumers at this price; in this case, the demand
is effectively φX and this becomes a standard newsvendor problem. As long as the fraction φ of
strategic consumers is large enough, the first alternative is preferred and our earlier model applies.
7. Conclusion
Strategic consumer behavior has largely been overlooked in the supply chain management literature.
This paper attempts to fill this gap. Our basic premise is that consumers look ahead and plan
purchases with future opportunities in mind. By doing so, consumers force firms to compete against
their own future selves. This can be alleviated if firms can somehow “promise” to consumers that
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future purchase opportunities will be unattractive: either prices will remain high, or availability
will be limited. However, in most situations, such commitments are not credible because firms will
be better off not fulfilling these commitments at the time they become due.
Decentralized supply chains, on the other hand, can make credible commitments to consumers in
an indirect way. Through appropriate contractual mechanisms, supply chain parties can structure
the incentive system such that it will indeed be in the best interests of at least one party to
maintain high prices or low availability in the future. Indirectly, these outcomes discourage strategic
behavior and increase supply chain profits. While decentralization has generally been associated
with coordination problems, we present the contrasting view that disparate interests within a
supply chain can actually be used to realize improved outcomes. In fact, decentralized supply chains
sometimes perform strictly better than their centralized counterparts.
Future research can extend our line of inquiry in several directions. First, a more comprehensive
study comparing supply chain performance under various contractual formats in the presence of
strategic customer behavior could be an interesting research direction. Second, many operational
strategies (e.g., quick response and collaborative forecasting) are designed to improve service levels
by creating more flexible replenishment opportunities or improving the demand forecast. However,
our analysis suggests that improving service levels may hurt firms’ profits because this places
customers at a better position to game against them. It would be interesting to investigate how the
introduction of customer behavior affects the incentives for adopting these operational strategies.
Third, a similar analysis can be conducted in a setting with horizontal competition. In this case, how
do strategic consumers influence the competitive landscape? In general, we believe that strategic
consumer behavior is a fruitful research topic. Beyond supply chain settings, similar issues also arise
in revenue management and in service contexts. We hope that the framework in this paper, based
on the rational expectations hypothesis, can be applied to other areas in operations management.
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Proofs of Statements
Supplementary Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1 The RE equilibrium conditions









respectively. Solving these equations yields the desired results.
Proof of Lemma 1 The first-order-condition Π′q(Q) = 0 yields
c− s
F (Q)
+ (v− s) f(Q)
F (Q)
E(X ∧Q) = (v− s)F (Q).
The left-hand-side is increasing (because F has an increasing failure rate), and the right-hand-
side is decreasing in Q, so the first-order-condition has a unique solution. Further, we know that
Π′q(0) = v− c > 0 and limQ→∞Π′q(Q) =−(c− s)< 0. Therefore, Πq(Q) is quasi-concave and has a
unique maximizer.
Proof of Proposition 2 (i) The derivative of Πq(Q) at Q=Qc is:
Π′q(Qc) = (v− s)F
2
(Qc)− (c− s)− (v− s)E(X ∧Qc)f(Qc)
= −(v− s)E(X ∧Qc)f(Qc)
< 0,
where the second equality follows from (v − s)F 2(Q)− (c− s) = 0. From the previous lemma we
know that Πq(Q) is increasing first and then decreasing in Q. Hence there must be Q∗q <Qc and
Π∗q ≥Πc.
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(ii) We begin by varying c ∈ [s, v] while holding s and v fixed. The seller’s profit in the RE
equilibrium is
Πc = (pc− s)E(X ∧Qc)− (c− s)Qc
=
√
(v− s)(c− s)E(X ∧Qc)− (c− s)Qc.

























)2E(X ∧Qc)− 12 .
It is clear that f(Qc)
2F¯ (Qc)
E(X ∧Qc) is increasing in Qc because F has an increasing failure rate. So




) ≤ 0 for Qc ≤ Qˆc and ddQc (dΠcdc ) ≥ 0 for Qc ≥ Qˆc. Since Qc is
monotonically decreasing in c, we know there exists c˜ such that Πc is concave in c for c≤ c˜ and Πc
is convex in c for c≥ c˜.
Next we show that Π∗q is convex and decreasing in c. Since
Πq(Q) = (p(Q)− s)E(X ∧Q)− (c− s)Q
= (v− s)F¯ (Q)E(X ∧Q)− (c− s)Q,











where the inequality follows from the fact that Q∗q is decreasing in c. Note that Π∗q |c=s > 0 while
Πc|c=s = 0, so the existence of cl follows.
To show the existence of ch, we first write down the first-order conditions for maximizing Πq(Q)
and Πc(Q), respectively. The former is
c− s
v− s + f(Q)E(X ∧Q) = F
2
(Q), (EC.3)
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and the latter is F (Q) =
√
c−s
v−s , or equivalently,
c− s
v− s = F
2
(Q). (EC.4)































12(v− s)f(0) > 0.
Note that Π∗q |c=v =Πc|c=v = 0 and hq(v) = hc(v) = 0. Together we know that there exists a ch such
that Π∗q −Πc is decreasing in c for c≥ ch (if ch < cl, then set ch = cl).












Define hq(v) ≡ ddvΠ∗q , hc(v) ≡ ddvΠc, and g(v) ≡ hq(v)− hc(v). Applying the Envelope Theorem
yields
























12(c− s)f(0) > 0.
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Note that Π∗q |v=c =Πc|v=c = 0 and hq(c) = hc(c) = 0. Therefore, there exists vl such that Π∗q −Πc is
increasing in v for v≤ vl.
Next we prove the existence of vh. From the first-order conditions (EC.3) and (EC.4), we know
that as v→∞, there is Q∗q→ Qˆ where Qˆ is the unique solution to
f(Q)E(X ∧Q) = F 2(Q)









the first term approaches a constant F (Qˆ)E(X ∧ Qˆ) while the second term goes to zero since
F (Qc)→ 0 and E(X ∧Qc) is bounded by E(X). This shows the existence of vh such that Π∗q −Πc
is increasing in v for v ≥ vh. (This proof shows an interesting point that the derivative of Π∗q
approaches a constant while the derivative of Πc approaches zero as v→∞.)
Proof of Proposition 3 The proof is similar to that of Proposition 2 and omitted.
Proof of Proposition 4 The proof is similar to that of Proposition 2 and omitted.
Proof of Lemma 2 Consider the equilibrium profits Πrw(Q) and Πmw (Q) as a function of equi-
librium quantities Q. Denote the maximizers of these functions Qrw ∈ argmaxQΠrw(Q) and Qmw ∈
argmaxQΠmw (Q). It suffices to show that (i) Qrw and Qmw are unique, and (ii) Qmw <Q∗q <Qrw.
(i) Taking derivative of Πrw(Q) gives
d
dQ
Πrw(Q) = (v− s)f(Q)[−E(X ∧Q)+ 2QF (Q)].
Let





g′(Q) = F (Q)− 2Qf(Q).
Since F has an increasing failure rate, we know g′(Q) starts at g′(0) = 1 and then decreases to the
negative domain. Thus, g(Q) starts at g(0) = 0, increases first, and then decreases to the negative
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domain. Let Qrw be the unique solution to g(Q) = 0, then Πrw(Q) is increasing for Q < Qrw and
decreasing for Q>Qrw. That is, Πrw(Q) is quasi-concave and has a unique maximizer.
The proof for Πmw (Q) is similar and omitted.








Πmw (Q) = (v− s)F
2




Πq(Q) = (v− s)F 2(Q)− (c− s)− (v− s)E(X ∧Q)f(Q) = 0.
Since E(X ∧ Qrw) = 2QrwF (Qrw) and Πrw(Q) is quasi-concave, we have ddQΠmw (Q) ≤ ddQΠq(Q) for
Q<Qrw and the opposite holds for Q>Qrw. Therefore, the only possible orderings for Qrw, Qmw , Q∗q
are Qrw <Q∗q <Qmw and Qmw <Q∗q <Qrw.
Next we show Q∗q <Qrw. The retailer’s optimal quantity Qrw is given by E(X ∧Qrw) = 2QrwF (Qrw)
and is determined only by the distribution function. Define β ≡ c−s
v−s (0< β < 1). Then, the first-
order condition for Q∗q can be written as
β+ f(Q)E(X ∧Q) = F 2(Q).
If β + f(Qrw)E(X ∧ Qrw) > F
2
(Qrw), then we know Q∗q < Qrw. Since β > 0, it suffices to show
f(Qrw)E(X ∧Qrw)>F
2
(Qrw). Plugging E(X ∧Qrw) = 2QrwF (Qrw) into the inequality, we only need
to show
F (Qrw)− 2Qrwf(Qrw)< 0.
Recall from (i) that g′(Q) = F (Q)− 2Qf(Q) = 0 has a unique solution. Let Qˆ be this solution. In
addition, Qrw is the unique solution to g(Q) = 0. This implies that Qˆ <Qrw, so we have
g′(Qrw) = F (Q
r
w)− 2Qrwf(Qrw)< g′(Qˆ) = 0.
The desired result follows.
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Proof of Proposition 7 First, recall that the equilibrium quantity Q∗q and price p∗ in the coordi-




p∗ = s+(v− s)F (Q∗q). (EC.6)
Now, consider the markdown money contract with parameters wm and m satisfying
wm− s−m = χ(w∗− s), (EC.7)
p∗− s−m = χ(p∗− s), (EC.8)
for some χ> 0. Recall that the RE equilibrium conditions under this contract are
F (Qm) =
wm− s−m
pm− s−m , (EC.9)
pm = s+(v− s)F (Qm). (EC.10)
Therefore, the RE equilibrium quantity Qm and price pm must satisfy
F (Qm) =
χ(w∗− s)
(pm− p∗)+χ(p∗− s) (EC.11)
pm = s+(v− s)F (Qm). (EC.12)
The solution to this pair of equations can not have pm > p∗ because this implies, by compar-
ing (EC.5) and (EC.11), that F (Qm) < F (Q∗q), which in turn implies, by comparing (EC.6) and
(EC.12), that pm < p∗, thereby raising a contradiction. Similarly, we can not have pm < p∗. There-
fore, in equilibrium, we must have pm = p∗ and Qm = Q∗q . This equilibrium attains the optimal
profit benchmark Π∗q . Notice from (EC.7) that the required condition wm − s−m> 0 holds true
because w∗ ≥ c > s.
Next, we show that setting χ= λ/λ∗ yields the desired profit allocation. The retailer’s equilibrium
profit is
Πrm(Qm, pm) = (pm− s−m)E(X ∧Qm)− (wm− s−m)Qm
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as required. Finally, with χ= λ/λ∗, solving (EC.7) and (EC.8) yields the desired parameters wm,m.















Observe that m≥ 0 if and only if λ≤ λ∗, so this yields our two cases. Part (i) follows directly from
Proposition 7. In (ii), we use wr =wm+ |m| and r= |m| to find the required parameters.
Proof of Proposition 9 Recall that the retailer faces the profit function
Πrb(Q) = (v− b)E(X ∧Q)− (wb− b)Q, (EC.14)
so the optimal stocking quantity is
F (Qrb) = (wb− b)/(v− b). (EC.15)
Recall also that the supply chain profit function is
Πb(Q) = vE(X ∧Q)− cQ, (EC.16)
which is maximized at Qb, as characterized by
F (Qb) = c/v. (EC.17)
The proof follows the standard approach in the supply chain contracting literature, so we shall
keep it brief. The appropriate buyback contract has two objectives: (i) to induce Qrb =Qb (coordi-
nation) and (ii) to yield a (λ,1−λ) division of profits (allocation). The two conditions v− b= λv
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and wb− b= λc together achieve both objectives because: (i) wb−bv−b = λcλv = cv , so from (EC.15) and
(EC.17), we have Qrb =Qb, and (ii) from (EC.14) and (EC.16), we have Πrb(Q) = (v− b)E(X ∧Q)−
(wb− b)Q= λvE(X ∧Q)−λcQ= λΠb(Q). Solving these two equations yields the desired contract




Extension of RE equilibrium to heterogeneous customers First, let ξprob,θ(p) denote type-θ’s
beliefs over the probability of availability on the salvage market. Based on these beliefs, let rθ(p)
denote type-θ’s reservation price. Next, we introduce the seller’s beliefs. Let ξrθ(p) be the seller’s
beliefs of type-θ’s reservation prices. Similarly, let ξα(p) denote the seller’s belief on the fraction of
customers who will buy early at the price p.
Now, let α(p) and β(u,p) respectively denote the fraction of customers who buy early and
the fraction of customers who will be served after type-u (if he waits), given the reservation
prices rθ(p) and actual price p. In other words, we have α(p) ≡
∫
{θ:rθ(p)≥p} dG(θ) and β(u,p) ≡∫
{θ:rθ(p)<p and θ≤u} dG(θ).
We shall use Π(Q,p;α) to denote the standard newsvendor profit function with stocking quantity
Q, price p, and demand αX (i.e. when the fraction of customers who buy early is α). Similarly,
let Q∗(p,α) and Π∗(p,α) denote the optimal order quantity and optimal profit in the standard
newsvendor model with price p and demand αX.




vθ− (vθ− s)ξprob,θ(p), Q> 0,
0, Q= 0,















(v) ξrθ(p) = rθ(p).
These RE conditions have the same interpretation as before. Condition (i) determines customers’
reservation prices, given their beliefs on availability probabilities as a function of the price that
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they have observed. Conditions (ii) and (iii) solves for the seller’s optimal price and quantity, given
their beliefs on reservation prices. Finally, conditions (iv) and (v) are consistency conditions.
The following lemma shows that in any RE equilibrium, the reservation prices must exhibit what
we call a threshold property. That is, for any price p, there must be some marginal type ϕ(p) such
that only customers with higher types are willing to buy.
Lemma EC.1. Suppose that the reservation prices rθ(p) are part of a RE equilibrium. Then,
there exists some function ϕ(p) such that
rθ(p) ≥ p, θ≥ϕ(p),
rθ(p) < p, θ < ϕ(p).
Proof of Lemma EC.1 Suppose that there is some price p at which types θ1 and θ2 are willing
to buy early, but not anyone in between (where θ1 < θ2). The RE equilibrium conditions (i) and
(iv) tell us that p≤ rθ1(p)< rθ2(p). On the other hand, rθ(p)→ rθ2(p) as θ→ θ−2 , so there must be
some types close enough to (but below) θ2 who are willing to buy as their reservation price exceeds
rθ1(p). This yields the desired contradiction.
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Supplementary Appendix B: Numerical Studies
In this online appendix, we present some numerical results of the heterogeneous model introduced
in Section 6.1. The customer pool is heterogeneous and indexed by θ ∈ [0,1]. For each type θ, there
is an associated valuation vθ, which is increasing in θ. That is, a higher type is associated with
a higher valuation. Assume the range of the valuation is [v0, v1] and c < v0. Let G(θ) denote the
proportion of customers of type θ and below (i.e., customers with valuations not exceeding vθ). The
total demand X follows distribution F . In other words, the number of customers with valuations
not exceeding vθ is given by the random variable G(θ)X.
The focus of this online appendix is on a decentralized supply chain under a wholesale price
contract w. We are interested to know how the retailer’s, the manufacturer’s, and the supply chain’s
profits vary as w increases. In particular, we want to know if the result that decentralization may
improve supply chain efficiency still holds when the retailer faces customers with heterogeneous
valuations. Below we show the figures for two particular examples, one with uniformly distributed
customer valuations (i.e., G is a uniform distribution) and the other with normally distributed
valuations (i.e., G is a normal distribution). We have tested many more examples, and the results
are very similar and therefore omitted.
In the first example, we use the following parameters: c= 4.5, s = 4, F is normal distribution
N(100,400), and G is uniform on [6,10]. Note that Figure 1 in the main text of the paper (Section
4.1) uses exactly the same parameters except that v is fixed at 8 rather than follow a uniform
distribution with a mean 8. According to Section 6.1, for a given wholesale price w, the retailer
optimizes her profit in the RE equilibrium by choosing a price p. We search for the optimal p for the
retailer for each w and calculate the corresponding equilibrium quantity and profit for the retailer.
Similarly, we calculate the manufacturer’s and the supply chain’s profits for each w. Figure EC.1
shows the three profit functions against the horizontal axis w.
We can see that Figure EC.1 displays some similar properties to those of Figure 1 in the main
text: first, the supply chain profit rises as w increases, indicating that double marginalization
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Figure EC.1 Comparison of the profit functions (demand follows a normal distribution N(100,400) and
parameter values are c= 4.5, s= 4, and v∼U [6,10]).
improves supply chain efficiency; second, since wr > c (recall wr is the profit-maximizing wholesale
price for the retailer), we know that the retailer may prefer a higher wholesale price when facing
strategic customers. Therefore, the introduction of heterogeneous customer valuations does not
remove the driving force underlying our counter-intuitive result: with the presence of strategic
customers, double marginalization help the retailer credibly reduce her order quantity and thus
improve the retailer’s and the supply chain’s profits.
In the second example, everything is the same as before but now G follows a truncated normal
distribution on [6,10] (the mean is again 8, the standard deviation is 2/3, and the truncated
probability is evenly distributed over the support). Figure EC.2 shows the three profit functions
over w and we can see that the qualitative results are similar.
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Figure EC.2 Comparison of the profit functions (demand follows a normal distribution N(100,400) and
parameter values are c= 4.5, s= 4, and v follows a truncated normal distribution on [6,10]).
